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If People Would Be Outraged by Their Rulings, Should Judges Care? 
 
Cass R. Sunstein
* 
 
 
Abstract 
 
At first glance, it is puzzling to suggest that courts should care whether the public 
would be outraged by their decisions; judicial anticipation of public outrage and its 
effects seems incompatible with judicial independence. Nonetheless, judges might be 
affected by the prospect of outrage for both consequentialist and epistemic reasons. If a 
judicial ruling would undermine the cause it is meant to promote or impose serious social 
harms, judges have reason to hesitate on consequentialist grounds. The prospect of 
public outrage might also suggest that the Court’s ruling would be incorrect on the 
merits; if most people disagree with the Court’s decision, perhaps the Court is wrong. 
Those who adopt a method on consequentialist grounds are more likely to want to 
consider outrage than are those who adopt an interpretive method on 
nonconsequentialist grounds (including some originalists). The epistemic argument for 
attention to outrage is greatly weakened if people suffer from a systematic bias or if the 
public view is a product of an informational, moral, or legal cascade. There is also a 
strong argument for banning consideration of the effects of public outrage on rule-
consequentialist grounds. Judges might be poorly suited to make the relevant inquiries, 
and consideration of outrage might produce undue timidity. These points have general 
implications for those who favor “popular constitutionalism,” or judicial restraint, on 
democratic grounds. An understanding of the consequentialist and epistemic grounds for 
judicial attention to public outrage also offers lessons for the decisions of other public 
officials, including presidents, governors, and mayors, who might be inclined to make 
decisions that will produce public outrage.  
 
I.  Introduction 
 
Judicial rulings can, and sometimes do, provoke public outrage. If the Supreme 
Court ruled that states must recognize same-sex marriages, national politics would 
undoubtedly be affected, and a movement for a constitutional amendment would be all 
but inevitable. If the Court said that the Establishment Clause forbids the use of the words 
“under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance,
1 the Court would face a great deal of public 
outrage. If the Court struck down measures designed to protect against the risk of 
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1 The Court avoided this issue in Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004). 2 
terrorism, especially in a period in which the risk was acutely felt, significant parts of the 
public would be outraged as well. Many judges are drawn, on occasion, to interpretations 
of the Constitution that would outrage large segments of the public. How, if at all, should 
courts think about, or deal with, the prospect of outrage? 
A detailed literature attempts to show that the Supreme Court’s decisions are 
generally in line with public opinion and that, in light of the Court’s actual practices, the 
“countermajoritarian difficulty”
2 is far less difficult than it might seem.
3 To this extent, a 
degree of “popular constitutionalism,”
4 captured in a measure of public control of 
constitutional meaning, seems to be alive and well. The Court rarely embarks on courses 
of action that are wildly out of step with the strongly held views of citizens as a whole.
5 
But there can be no question that the Court’s decisions can provoke public outrage, and 
that the Court sometimes works to reduce the likelihood and intensity of that outrage.
6 
The most famous example is Naim v. Naim,
7 in which the Court refused to rule on the 
constitutionality of a ban on racial intermarriage, largely because it feared that its ruling 
would provoke outrage, in a way that might diminish the Court’s own authority.
8 It is 
reasonable to speculate that the Court’s refusal to decide the constitutionality of the use 
of the words “under God,” in the Pledge of Allegiance, had similar motivations.
9 The use 
of the “passive virtues,” including justiciability doctrines, is often understood as an effort 
to ensure that the Court’s timing is “prudent,” in the sense of ensuring that judicial 
decisions do not produce public reactions that will compromise the Court’s goals.
10 
My topic here is the normative question, not the positive one. With respect to 
anticipated public outrage, the positive issues have received sustained attention, whereas 
                                                 
2 See ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, 16–23 (1965). 
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the normative issues have been explored only episodically.
11 My principal goal is to 
investigate whether and why anticipated public outrage should matter to judicial 
decisions.
12 At first glance, an affirmative answer seems quite jarring; many people 
believe that courts should interpret the Constitution without attention to the possible 
objections of the public.
13 On this view, the central point of constitutional law, or at least 
judicial review, is to impose an obstacle to public judgments and sometimes to override 
those judgments even if they are intensely held. It would be odd to say that the Supreme 
Court should not protect free speech or should allow racial discrimination if and because 
it anticipates that the public would be outraged by protection of free speech or by bans on 
racial discrimination. The idea that the Court should anticipate and consider the effects of 
public outrage seems inconsistent with the role of an independent judiciary in the 
constitutional system. 
Questioning the standard view, I shall suggest two reasons why public outrage 
might matter. The first is consequentialist; the second is epistemic. The consequentialist 
reason is that if a ruling would turn out to have terrible consequences, judges should take 
that possibility into account. This claim depends on the assumption that the argument for 
judicial rulings depends, in part, on their effects. It is all very well to say that judges 
should rule as they see fit even if the heavens would fall. But if the heavens really would 
fall, judges should not rule as they see fit. The epistemic reason involves humility: Judges 
cannot always know whether they are right, even about the meaning of the Constitution, 
and intense public convictions may provide relevant information about the correctness of 
their conclusions. Whether public convictions are pertinent depends in part on their 
foundations and in part on the prevailing method of constitutional interpretation. If the 
                                                 
11 The most sustained treatment is id., with the emphasis on the “passive virtues” as a response, in part, to 
the problem of public outrage. As we shall see, however, Bickel did not provide firm underpinnings for the 
Court’s consideration of public disapproval of its decisions, and was hence left vulnerable to the charge of 
opportunism. See Gunther, supra note 6 (criticizing use of passive virtues as unprincipled). 
12 There is an obvious relationship between this topic and the general one of “popular constitutionalism,” 
which sees We the People as a kind of tribunal of last resort. See KRAMER, supra note 4. I offer a few 
remarks on the relationship below. 
13 This view can be found, in one or another form, in RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES (2006); 
GEOFFREY STONE, PERILOUS TIMES (2005); and Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law is A Law of Rules, 56 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1180 (1989). We might take this view as standard while acknowledging that many 
people believe that doctrines of justiciability are properly used to limit the Court’s intervention in deference 
to public reaction. See BICKEL, supra note 2. To the extent that this belief is widely held, as it may be, the 
argument here might be seen as an effort to explain how it might be best defended.  4 
prevailing method makes constitutional adjudication turn on disputable judgments of fact 
or morality, the beliefs of the public may indeed be relevant. It is important, however, to 
know whether these public beliefs are subject to a systematic bias or to cascade effects. If 
so, there is much less reason to consider them, because they lack epistemic credentials. 
To assess the consequentialist and epistemic grounds for considering public 
outrage, it is necessary to distinguish between invalidations and validations of decisions 
of the elected branches. Courts have far more reason to consider outrage before 
invalidating such decisions than before validating them; statutory interpretation generally 
belongs in the same category as validations. There is, however, a plausible rule-
consequentialist argument for asking judges not to consider public outrage even in the 
context of invalidations: Judicial judgments about outrage may be unreliable, and 
consideration of outrage may produce excessive judicial timidity. While plausible in the 
abstract, this argument depends on contestable empirical assumptions and may turn out to 
be wrong. If it is clear that a decision would outrage the public and that such outrage 
would be both intense and very harmful, courts have reason to hesitate before 
invalidating the decisions of the elected branches. My principal goal is not, however, to 
defend judicial attention to outrage, but to explore the grounds on which both 
consideration of outrage and indifference to outrage might be defended. 
A recurring issue is whether judges have enough information to be confident 
about either their judgments on the merits or their assessments of the existence and 
effects of outrage. It is helpful to begin by assuming that they have such information and 
by seeing how the analysis proceeds on that (admittedly unrealistic) assumption. Once 
the assumption is relaxed, the consequentialist argument for considering outrage is 
weakened, while the epistemic argument is strengthened. Those who believe that courts 
should refuse to attend to public outrage are on secure grounds if judges have little 
information about the likely effects of their rulings and a great deal of information about 
the proper interpretation of the Constitution. Those who believe that public outrage is 
highly relevant are likely to assume that in assessing consequences, judges are not at 5 
sea—and more fundamentally that judges do not have special or unique access to 
constitutional meaning.
14 
While my focus is on public outrage and its consequences, the discussion will 
bear on some larger questions. Nearly every public institution is barred from taking 
account of certain considerations that plainly ought to matter from a consequentialist 
perspective. The ban on consideration of certain factors often operates as a legal or moral 
taboo; but why? The most plausible answer is that in some settings, the overall 
consequences are much better if institutions refuse to take account of certain 
consequences. A more implication is that in both the private and public spheres, “role 
morality” – the particular moral principles associated with particular social roles – may 
be best justified on rule-consequentialist grounds. 
If the analysis of the consequentialist and epistemic arguments has force, it should 
also have general implications for those who favor “popular constitutionalism”
15 and for 
those who are skeptical about the institution of judicial review on democratic grounds.
16 
Some of the best arguments for popular constitutionalism, and for those who challenge 
judicial rule, may well be epistemic in character; perhaps the citizenry has a better 
understanding, under some circumstances, of how the founding document should be 
construed.
17 But I shall raise serious questions about both consequentialist and epistemic 
arguments for considering outrage, and by understanding the limitations of those 
arguments, we shall be in a better position to assess the claims of those who question 
judicial review in the name of democracy. A general lesson is that no conclusions – about 
the proper response to outrage, popular constitutionalism, or judicial review—can be 
established in the abstract, or though large-scale claims about the goals and nature of self-
government.  
As we shall see, the epistemic argument for considering outrage is based on the 
general idea that large groups of people are highly likely to be right, at least if most group 
members are at least somewhat likely to be right. This idea helps to explain recent 
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17 See MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1998). 6 
enthusiasm for the “wisdom of crowds.”
18 With respect to constitutional interpretation, 
however, crowds may not be so wise, because they may suffer from a systematic bias, or 
because their judgments may be a product of informational cascades, often induced by 
“meaning entrepreneurs.” An understanding of the problems introduced by systematic 
biases, and by cascade effects, bears both on popular constitutional and the risk that large 
groups may be quite mistaken. 
This Article comes in six parts. Part II discusses invalidations and 
consequentialist arguments for considering public outrage. Part III explores the 
possibility that when outrage is anticipated, judges should take it into account for 
epistemic reasons. Part IV turns to the case of validations, with brief reference to the 
question of statutory interpretation. Part V discusses approaches to constitutional 
interpretation that might seem to counsel against considering outrage; originalism is the 
main example here, but those who emphasize “moral readings” of the Constitution might 
also be skeptical of the idea that judges should consider outrage. Part V also considers 
minority outrage. Part VI briefly explores the relevance of the consequentialist and 
epistemic arguments for others exercising public authority, including presidents, 
legislators, governors, mayors, and jurors. A primary claim here is that when officials 
consider public outrage, they might be humble rather than cowardly, acting as they do 
because they believe their own judgments are imperfectly reliable. 
 
II.  Invalidations and Consequences 
 
Let us begin with cases posing the question whether anticipated public outrage 
should play a role in a judge’s decision whether to vote to invalidate a decision of the 
elected branches, whether state or federal, on constitutional grounds. As we shall see, 
such cases present the strongest arguments for considering outrage. Throughout I shall 
assume that a strong majority of the public, rather than a minority, is outraged; I shall 
turn to the case of minority outrage in due course.
19 
 
                                                 
18 See JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS (2004); SCOTT PAGE, THE DIFFERENCE (2007). 
19 See infra. 7 
A. The Problem 
 
  Suppose that a member of the Supreme Court, Justice Bentham, is convinced after 
due deliberation of the following propositions: 
 
1A. The ban on same-sex marriages is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. 
1B. The ban on polygamous marriages is a violation of the Due Process Clause. 
1C. The use of the words “under God,” in the Pledge of Allegiance, is a violation 
of the Establishment Clause. 
1D. Capital punishment is inconsistent with the Eighth Amendment. 
1E. The President may not commit troops to a military conflict without either a 
formal declaration of war or an authorization to use force from Congress. 
1F. Racial segregation in a high-security prison is a violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause. 
 
Suppose that all six of these propositions are at issue in cases before the Court (it 
is an exciting term). In all six cases, the Court is deadlocked 4–4; Justice Bentham has the 
deciding vote. Suppose finally that Bentham believes that if he votes as his convictions 
suggest, there will be extremely serious public opposition, going well beyond 
disagreement to outrage. In all six cases, he believes that the Court’s decision will 
become highly relevant to national politics, and that those who side with the Court, and 
even those who do not vigorously oppose it, will suffer badly. In cases 1A–1D, he 
believes that many officials will refuse to accept the Court’s decision, and the 
Constitution will be amended to overturn the Court’s decision. In case 1E, troops have 
already been committed, and Bentham thinks that from the standpoint of national 
security, and protection of lives of American soldiers, the Court’s decision is very bad. In 
case 1F, Bentham believes that if he votes in accordance with his commitments, so as to 
require immediate desegregation, officials will refuse to obey, and segregation will 
continue. How should Bentham vote? 
To orient the discussion, let us begin with two simplifying assumptions 
(eventually to be relaxed). First, Bentham has no doubt at all about the correctness of his 
views in the six cases. He is certain, and he is certain that he has excellent reason to be 8 
certain, that he is right about the meaning of the Constitution. Second, Bentham has no 
doubt about his predictions about the consequences of the Court’s decision. He happens 
to have an entirely accurate crystal ball, and he knows what will happen if the Court does 
as he thinks best, as a matter of principle. Bentham is aware that different consequences 
might play a different role in his assessment about what to do. Perhaps a constitutional 
amendment, overturning the Court’s decision, is acceptable, whereas a significant 
increase in the risk to national security is much less so. I will return to these complexities 
shortly; let us simply stipulate that Bentham has good reason to think that if he votes as 
he sees fit, very bad consequences will follow. 
 
B. Options, Passivity, Minimalism 
 
Suppose that Bentham is inclined to consider public outrage in cases 1A–1F. If 
the risk is sufficiently serious, it might tip the balance in terms of his ultimate vote. He is 
likely to ask: What are my options here? Perhaps Bentham can refuse to address the 
merits at all, postponing them for another day. In case 1C, for example, Bentham might 
look for some ground, such as standing or ripeness, that would allow him not to express a 
view on the underlying issues.  
To see why, consider Alexander Bickel’s influential discussion of the “passive 
virtues.”
20 Bickel insisted that the Court’s role was not to uncover the Constitution’s 
original meaning but to identify and to announce certain enduring values—to discern 
principles that would properly organize constitutional life. Bickel believed that courts 
were in a unique position to carry out that role. In his view, “courts have certain 
capacities for dealing with matters of principle that legislatures and executives do not 
possess.”
21 Bickel did not believe that judgments about those matters would be static; he 
fully recognized the Court’s creative role. At the same time, Bickel thought that a 
heterogeneous society could not possibly be governed by an array of judicially-
announced principles. In his view, “[n]o good society can be unprincipled; and no viable 
society can be principle-ridden.”
22 On some occasions, the Court should give the political 
                                                 
20 See BICKEL, supra note 2, at 111–98. But see  Gunther, supra note 6 (criticizing use of justiciability 
doctrines to avoid principled decisionmaking). 
21 See BICKEL, supra note 2, at 25. 
22 Id. at 64. 9 
processes relatively free play, by neither upholding nor invalidating its decisions. The 
Court’s task in judicial review is to maintain both “guiding principle and expedient 
compromise”
23—and to do so by staying its hand in the face of strong popular opposition, 
however indefensible the opposition might be. Bickel did not specify the precise grounds 
on which courts should stay their hands, but a judgment about the consequences of not 
doing so would undoubtedly motivate their hesitation. 
Perhaps Bentham is unable to exercise the passive virtues so as to avoid 
addressing the merits. Even if so, Bentham might be able to address the merits in a way 
that reduces the magnitude and effects of public outrage. He might ensure that the Court 
rules modestly or in a way that avoids theoretical ambition to the extent possible. 
Bentham might aim for a degree of narrowness, in the form of a decision that leaves 
many issues unresolved, or instead shallowness, in the form of a decision that is agnostic 
on some of the deepest questions.
24 In case 1A, for example, Bentham might say: “States 
must provide the incidents of marriage to same-sex couples; we need not decide whether 
(or we do not decide that) states must make marriage itself available.” In case 1B, 
Bentham might say: “States may not forbid religious institutions from performing and 
respecting polygamous marriages; we need not decide whether (or we do not decide that) 
states must perform and respect such marriages.” In this way, a minimalist strategy, 
reducing or eliminating public outrage, might be tempting. 
Bentham is most unlikely to want to join the view of those justices with whom he 
disagrees on the merits; he will not be inclined to commit himself to an interpretation of 
the Constitution that he rejects on principle. Nor will Bentham want to misstate the actual 
grounds for his conclusion.
25 But suppose that he cannot invoke any basis for avoiding 
                                                 
23 Id. 
24 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME (1999). 
25 This point itself raises serious puzzles. If Bentham is a consequentialist, why will he refuse to lie about 
the grounds for his judgment, if lying would produce good consequences? One answer is that lies can 
ultimately produce bad consequences; the publicity condition, requiring officials to act in ways that can be 
defended honestly and in public, might be understood in these terms. See David Luban, The Publicity 
Principle, in THE THEORY OF INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 154 (1996). Another answer is that notwithstanding 
his name, Bentham may believe that lying is an intrinsic wrong, because it does not treat his fellow citizens 
with respect. See David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91 COLUM. L. 
REV. 334, 353–61 (1991). Note that Bentham is a consequentialist, not a utilitarian; he may therefore 
believe that treating people disrespectfully is an independent wrong, one that counts in the consequentialist 
calculus. See Amartya Sen, Fertility and Coercion, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1035, 1038–39 (1996) (noting 
possibility of considering rights violations as part of assessment of consequences). 10 
the constitutional question, and that he is certain that if public outrage and its effects are 
considered, the Court should greatly hesitate before ruling in favor of propositions 1A–
1F. Perhaps he could write a concurring opinion that starts with these two sentences: “I 
am not convinced that the prevailing view is correct in its interpretation of the 
Constitution. But in view of the appropriately modest role of the judiciary in a democratic 
society, I concur in the judgment.” To make this opinion plausible, Bentham would have 
to spell out, with some particularity, exactly what is entailed by the second sentence. He 
might gesture in terms of epistemic considerations, pointing to the need to pay respectful 
attention to the considered judgments of other branches
26 and his fellow citizens. He 
might add a reference to consequentialist considerations, pointing to sharp social 
divisions and the potentially unfortunate effects of judicial intervention into a sensitive 
area.
27 To see how an opinion of this kind might be made plausible, we need to 
investigate some details. 
 
C. Kantian Adjudication 
 
Perhaps Bentham will not attend to intensely held public opposition at all. 
Perhaps Bentham (notwithstanding his name) is committed to a principle of Kantian 
adjudication: Even if the heavens will fall, the Constitution must be interpreted properly. 
Indeed, Kantian adjudication appears to be the informal working theory of judges and 
lawyers, so much so as to make it plausibly outrageous for judges to defer to outrage—
though actual judicial practices suggest a far more complicated picture.
28 
According to those who endorse Kantian adjudication, the proper interpretation of 
the Constitution has nothing to do with what the public believes or wants. The role of the 
Court is to say what the law is, and its conclusions on that point should have nothing to 
                                                 
26 See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64 (1981) (noting need to attend to constitutional judgments of 
other branches). 
27 See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 704 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) (fearing that deeming a ten 
commandments display a violation of the Establishment Clause would “encourage disputes concerning the 
removal of longstanding depictions of the Ten Commandments” and “create the very kind of . . . 
divisiveness that the Establishment Clause seeks to avoid”); Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 
U.S. 1, 15 (2004) (referring to “a highly public debate over . . . the propriety of a widespread national ritual 
and the meaning of our constitution”). 
28 See supra notes 2–11. 11 
do with the public’s will.
29 Indeed, a sharp separation between law and politics might be 
thought to depend, crucially, on a commitment to Kantian adjudication. Compare the 
domain of statutory interpretation. Suppose that Bentham believes that the Endangered 
Species Act
30 compels the termination of a popular and nearly-completed project,
31 or 
that the Civil Rights Act of 1964
32 permits affirmative action;
33 suppose too that both of 
these rulings will provoke public outrage. At least at first glance, it would seem 
implausible to say that Bentham should alter his votes about statutory meaning to avoid 
such outrage. (We will return to the question why this is so.
34) In the context of potential 
invalidations, the argument for Kantian adjudication might seem even more forceful. 
Why should judges uphold unconstitutional measures—for example, racial discrimination 
or restrictions on free speech—merely because the public would be outraged if they 
refused to do so? Deference to public outrage seems hopelessly inconsistent with the role 
of judges in a constitutional system. 
But for two reasons, there is a serious question whether judges should be 
unconditionally committed to Kantian adjudication. The first reason is that even Kantians 
typically believe that moral rules can be subject to consequentialist override if the 
consequences are sufficiently serious.35 If total catastrophe really would ensue, judges 
should not rule as they believe principle requires. Suppose that the consequence of a 
ruling consistent with 1E would be to endanger national security; perhaps judges should 
refuse to issue that ruling. Consider in this regard Justice Jackson’s conclusion that while 
courts should not enforce the military order to detain Japanese-Americans on the West 
Coast, he did not mean to “suggest that courts should have attempted to interfere with the 
Army in carrying out its task.”
36  
Or suppose that the consequence of a ruling consistent with 1A would be merely 
to hasten a result that would have taken place without the Court’s invalidation, while also 
heightening political polarization, promoting the electoral prospects of those who reject 
                                                 
29 See Scalia, supra note 13. 
30 16 U.S.C.A. §§1531-1544 (West 2000 & Supp. 2004). 
31 Cf. TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978). 
32 42 U.S.C. §§2000d-2000d-7 (2000). 
33 Cf. Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979). 
34 See infra. 
35 For an overview, see Larry Alexander, Deontology at the Threshold, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 893, 898–
901 (2000). 
36 See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 248 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 12 
same-sex marriage, increasing hostility to gays and lesbians, and eventually leading to a 
constitutional ban on same-sex marriage. In this way, a ruling consistent with 1A would 
prove self-defeating in the particular sense that it would greatly decrease the likelihood 
that same-sex marriages would ultimately be recognized. Even a committed Kantian 
adjudicator might well hesitate to rule in the way indicated by 1A. 
The second and more fundamental reason is that the principle of Kantian 
adjudication does not make much sense. The core Kantian claim is that people should be 
treated as ends, not as means.
37 One person should not lie to another, or trick another into 
doing his bidding, because lies and tricks treat people as mere means, and do not give 
them the respect that they deserve. Is Kantian adjudication necessary to ensure that 
people are treated as ends rather than as means? It is hard to see why. In the end, Kantian 
adjudication is best understood as a kind of moral heuristic,
38 justified on rule-
consequentialist or systemic grounds. The claim must be that certain people in certain 
roles ought not to consider certain consequences, because consideration of such 
consequences would likely lead to bad consequences. If, for example, the Supreme Court 
decided voting rights cases by asking whether one or another decision would have good 
consequences by helping the best political candidates, the social consequences would not 
likely be good. In short, the intuitive judgment that certain consequences, or all 
consequences, are off-limits to certain officials must be justified on consequentialist 
grounds. But to say that is to get ahead of the story. 
 
D. Consequentialism 
 
Suppose Bentham believes that acts must be evaluated by asking whether they 
produce good consequences, all things considered. At first glance, the commitment to 
consequentialism means that Bentham had better take account of the effects of the 
Court’s decision. If Bentham has a reliable crystal ball, and he is sure that public outrage 
will ensure serious adverse effects from rulings consistent with 1A–1F, those effects must 
be taken into account. Let us stipulate that Bentham’s theory of constitutional 
interpretation, putting public outrage to one side, is itself based on consequentialist 
                                                 
37 For a good discussion, see Christine Korsgaard, The Right to Lie: Kant on Dealing with Evil, 15 PHIL. & 
PUB. AFF. 325 (1986).  
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considerations.
39 If Justice Bentham is a consequentialist, of course, he will not be much 
interested in public outrage as such. The question is whether that outrage will produce 
bad effects. If so, it would be seem especially odd for him to refuse to consider public 
outrage to the extent that it bears on the consequences of one or another ruling. 
We might imagine three reasons that outrage might lead to bad consequences.
40 
First, it may render a judicial decision futile. Suppose, for example, that in 1954, a ruling 
in favor of immediate desegregation would simply be ignored. An argument in favor of 
the “all deliberate speed” formulation in Brown v. Board of Education
41 was that it was 
necessary to ensure that desegregation would actually occur and that the Court’s ruling 
would ultimately be obeyed.
42 Second, outrage might make a judicial decision perverse, 
in the sense that it might produce consequences that are the opposite of what was 
intended by the Court. In the political domain, it is easy to think of illustrations, as when 
an environmental regulation, imposed on new polluting sources, turns out to increase 
pollution by increasing the life and use of old polluting sources.
43 In the legal domain, we 
can imagine how a decision in 1962 requiring states to recognize racial intermarriage 
might have fueled resistance to racial desegregation and thus disserved the goal of 
ensuring compliance with the Equal Protection Clause in general.
44 Third, outrage may 
render a judicial decision neither futile nor perverse, but might produce overall harm, as 
when the Court vindicates a constitutional principle in such a way as to endanger national 
security.
45 Some people believe that judges rightly interpret the Constitution with an eye 
                                                 
39 A straightforwardly consequentialist argument in favor of a particular approach to interpretation can be 
found in STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY (2005). 
40 I borrow here from ALBERT  O.  HIRSCHMAN,  THE  RHETORIC OF REACTION:  PERVERSITY,  FUTILITY, 
JEOPARDY (1991). 
41 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955). 
42 The ruling was of course very controversial. For illuminating discussion, see KLARMAN, supra note 3; 
RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (2d ed. 2004); and J. HARVIE WILKINSON, FROM BROWN TO BAKKE 
(1979).  
43See HOWARD GRENSPECHT, ZERO EMISSIONS VEHICLES: A DIRTY LITTLE SECRET (2000), available at 
http://www.aei.brookings.org/publications/abstract.php?pid=92 (contending that requirement of low-
polluting new vehicles will actually increase pollution in short-run, by extending life of older, high-
polluting vehicles). 
44 See Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 985 (1956) (declining to decide whether bans on racial intermarriage are 
unconstitutional). There are of course difficult issues about how to characterize the underlying goals, such 
that a particular decision would turn out to be perverse. 
45 This is the fear in Justice Jackson’s dissent in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 248 (1944), and 
probably in the Court’s opinion as well, see id. at 220 (“when under conditions of modern warfare our 
shores are threatened by hostile forces, the power to protect must be commensurate with the threatened 
danger”). 14 
toward consequences, and in particular so as to ensure that national security is not 
threatened by their rulings.
46 
1. Assessing consequences. An immediate problem for Bentham is that by itself, 
the idea of consequentialism is insufficiently informative. It does not tell us how to weigh 
the potential consequences or even to tell whether certain outcomes are good or bad.
47 
Suppose, as seems plausible, that Roe v. Wade
48 led to a great deal of political 
polarization, which would not have occurred if the Court had refused to recognize a right 
to choose abortion or if the Court had proceeded more cautiously.
49 If so, did Roe 
therefore have bad consequences on balance? That question cannot be answered without 
assigning weights to its various effects, including immediate legalization of most 
abortions in the United States. It is also possible that Bentham will conclude that for good 
consequentialist reasons, some consequences should not be considered. Bentham might 
ultimately adopt a form of second-order or rule-consequentialism, through which he 
blinds himself to certain effects of his decisions. 
To see the difficulties here, suppose that in a case involving same-sex marriage, 
Bentham has three options: (1) vote in accordance with 1A, (2) refuse to rule on the 
merits, or (3) vote to uphold bans on same-sex marriage. Perhaps Bentham thinks that if 
he takes the first course, same-sex marriage will be outlawed by constitutional 
amendment, raising a risks of both futility and perversity. Perhaps Bentham knows that if 
he refuses to rule on the merits, same-sex marriage will be widely permitted in the United 
States, and sooner rather than later. Perhaps Bentham believes that if he votes to allow 
bans on same-sex marriage, legislation allowing same-sex marriages will actually be 
passed very quickly; the Court’s unfortunate ruling will actually promote the 
achievement of a situation that (in Bentham’s view) the Constitution now requires.  
How should Bentham assess this possibility? Perhaps Bentham believes that as a 
matter of principle, same-sex marriages ought to be recognized in a free society. But 
perhaps Bentham believes only that the existing Constitution is best interpreted to require 
states to recognize such marriages—and that it is also perfectly legitimate, and entirely 
                                                 
46  See R ICHARD  A.  POSNER,  NOT  A  SUICIDE  PACT (2006) (arguing for pragmatic approach to the 
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47 See DWORKIN, supra note 13. 
48 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
49 See GERALD ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE (1999). 15 
appropriate, for a constitutional amendment to disallow same-sex marriages. Whether the 
prospect of such an amendment counts as a bad consequence cannot be resolved unless 
Bentham makes supplemental judgments of various sorts. Bentham might believe, for 
example, that an amendment is not a relevant consequence, because his own personal 
views about same-sex marriage are immaterial; his legal judgments matter, not his 
personal views. If this is his belief, then there is no risk of either perversity or futility. 
Bentham might be willing to consider public outrage in deciding on the appropriate 
remedy for a constitutional violation, if outrage is relevant to the effectiveness of any 
such remedy. But if outrage will culminate in an amendment, perhaps Bentham need not 
and should not pay attention. If this is so, it is because the ultimate fate of same-sex 
marriage is none of his concern. This is a plausible view, but it ultimately requires some 
kind of consequentialist defense—as, for example, in the view that judges will do best if 
they do not take account of the risk that their decisions will be rejected through 
amendment. 
Even if Bentham’s preferred ruling on 1A does not produce an amendment, 
perhaps that ruling will mobilize opponents of the rights or interests in question, and 
demobilize those who endorse those rights or interests, in a way that will disserve some 
of Bentham’s deepest convictions.
50 Perhaps the rulings will alter the nation’s political 
dynamics, promoting the interests of one party and undermining the interests of another. 
Perhaps the ruling will have no such effects, but perhaps it will sharply increase political 
polarization, leading to a great deal of hostility between those who approve and those 
who disapprove of the Court’s decision.
51 Bentham must decide whether these 
consequences matter and, if so, how much weight to assign to them. 
There is another consideration, one that involves the Court’s own “capital.” And 
indeed, most discussion of the “passive virtues,” and of judicial caution in imposing itself 
on the public, has been focused on this consideration.
52 Perhaps the ruling will increase 
public attacks on the Court, making the judiciary a salient target in elections and spurring 
jurisdiction-stripping bills and other legislative efforts to reduce the Court’s authority and 
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52 See, e.g., BICKEL, supra note 2. 16 
independence. If the Court is concerned about its own place in the constitutional 
structure, and wants to maintain its power, it might take account of outrage as a method 
of self-preservation. 
Or suppose more particularly that Bentham’s crystal ball tells him that if he 
vindicates proposition 1A, same-sex marriages will occur, and be respected, in all states; 
that the nation will have an intense and hostile debate about the question; that the 
Republican Party will greatly benefit from the debate; and that a proposed constitutional 
amendment to ban same-sex marriages will ultimately fail. How is Bentham to assess 
these consequences? Perhaps he does not consider these consequences especially bad. 
Perhaps his commitment to the underlying principle is sufficiently strong that he is 
prepared to vindicate it so long as same-sex marriages will occur and be respected and so 
long as the proposed amendment will fail. Perhaps the increase in polarization, and the 
political consequences, are not sufficient to outweigh the desirable consequences that 
would follow from the ruling he favors. The simple point is that even if outrage leads to 
unintended or harmful consequences, Bentham cannot know that he should avoid 
outrage, because the good consequences might nonetheless outweigh the bad ones. 
Or suppose Bentham’s crystal ball shows that if he vindicates proposition 1D, 
capital punishment will cease in the United States for a long time; that the nation will 
have an intense and hostile debate about the question; that the Republican Party will 
greatly benefit from that debate; that a proposed constitutional amendment to allow the 
death penalty will ultimately fail; and that the Court itself will be subject to extremely 
harsh attacks for at least a decade. How should these consequences be assessed? Perhaps 
Bentham’s commitment to the abolition of capital punishment, on grounds of 
constitutional principle, is very strong, and perhaps nothing in this catalogue of 
consequences outweighs that commitment. Why should human beings be executed, in 
violation of constitutional commands, merely because the nation will be more polarized, 
some politicians will win and others will lose, and the Court itself will come under 
assault? 
As I have suggested, Bentham might believe that certain consequences—such as 
the prospect of a constitutional amendment or the favorable effects on one or another 
party—ought not to be counted at all. This conclusion would itself have to be explained 17 
on consequential grounds. If one party would produce better consequences than another 
party, is it so clear that consequentialist judges should ignore that fact? (What if a 
particular outcome would ensure the defeat of the Nazi Party?) Under ordinary 
circumstances, consequentialists should be prepared to accept a second-order constraint 
on judicial consideration of political effects, on the ground that the overall consequences 
would be bad if judges asked whether their rulings would favor one or another political 
party.
53 Perhaps the same conclusion ought to hold for consideration of whether a 
constitutional amendment would ensue, on the ground that the overall consequences 
would be better if judges did not consider that question.  
The most general point is that the consequentialist needs an account of value to 
know whether the various consequences are good or bad, and to know the magnitudes to 
the various effects. The difficulty and contentiousness of the assessment might well lead 
courts to adopt a general presumption or even a firm rule against considering the effects 
of public outrage. But let us simply stipulate that in some cases, of which 1A-1F are 
plausible examples, consideration of consequences will tip the balance against deciding 
the case in accordance with the principles to which Bentham otherwise subscribes. 
2. Interpretive theories and consequences. This conclusion raises an immediate 
puzzle: What is the theory of interpretation that gives rise to Bentham’s conclusions in 
cases 1A–1F? Is it a consequentialist theory? Does Bentham hold it because of its 
consequences? A consequentialist had better give an affirmative answer.  
To come to terms with this point, we should distinguish between Bentham’s 
theory of interpretation and Bentham’s theory of adjudication. We could imagine a judge 
who has a consequentialist theory of both interpretation and adjudication, that is, whose 
view about constitutional interpretation depends on the consequences, and who is alert to 
consequences in deciding how, exactly, to rule. Justice Stephen Breyer and Judge 
Richard A. Posner appear to fall in this category.
54 Their accounts of interpretation are 
based on consequences, and they also think that judges should attend to consequences in 
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take account of a judgment about whether George Bush or Al Gore would be a better president. It is 
interesting that pragmatic judges, insistent on taking account of consequences, implicitly ruled that 
consideration entirely out of bounds. See R ICHARD POSNER, BUSH V. GORE (2001). The puzzle for the 
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particular cases.
55 By contrast, we could imagine a judge who has a nonconsequentialist 
theory of interpretation, believing (for example) that originalism is the only plausible 
approach,
56 but also agreeing that consequences matter when a judge is deciding whether 
and how broadly to rule. We could imagine a judge who believes that consequences are 
irrelevant both to interpretation and to adjudication. We could even imagine a judge who 
adopts a theory of interpretation on consequentialist grounds, but who believes that 
consequences are irrelevant to judicial rulings, once the appropriate method is applied.
57 
It should be clear that Bentham is not an originalist; but why not? Suppose that 
Bentham rejects originalism because in his view, it would produce unacceptable 
consequences.
58 Suppose that Bentham also believes that the Court should usually be 
reluctant to strike down acts of the elected branches, because a presumption of validity 
will lead to good consequences.
59 Suppose finally that the other ingredients of Bentham’s 
own approach to interpretation are somewhat eclectic. Perhaps he is inclined to require 
the executive to be able to show clear legislative authorization for many actions involving 
national security.
60 Perhaps he believes that the Court properly takes a somewhat 
aggressive role in protecting traditionally disadvantaged groups and in protecting the 
most intimate of choices.
61 Suppose that Bentham is ultimately prepared to justify his 
approach, however eclectic it may be, in terms of its consequences. If so, consideration of 
public outrage seems at first glance reasonable and perhaps even obligatory, at least if 
that outrage would lead to bad consequences. 
3.  Judicial fallibility in assessing consequences: of rule-consequentialism and 
system design. If Bentham sits on the Supreme Court, however, he might well be nervous 
about certain forms of consequentialism. Let us relax a central assumption and assume 
that Bentham has no crystal ball. He likes to think that he is not at sea in deciding 
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whether the public will be outraged, and he has a degree of confidence in his judgments 
about the likely consequence of that outrage in particular cases. But Bentham knows that 
he may be wrong. He is entirely alert to human fallibility, and he is aware that even if his 
own judgments are fairly good, others are not so lucky. There are two independent 
problems here. The first is a simple lack of information. A projection of the existence of 
outrage may be a shot in the dark. A projection of the effects of outrage may be more 
speculative still, not least because judges may rely on information sources that are 
themselves unrepresentative and therefore biased. The second problem is motivational. 
Desires can influence judgments,
62 and judges who favor certain results, or who are 
generally self-protective, may make erroneous judgments about the likelihood and effects 
of outrage. 
Suppose that in light of the absence of crystal balls, Bentham thinks that 
consideration of the risk of public outrage will seriously complicate judicial judgments, 
without at the same time improving them from the consequentialist standpoint.
63 
Bentham would be inclined to consider the following view: Even if accurate judgments 
about public outrage would be, at least in extreme cases, a legitimate part of judicial 
thinking, the risk of error means that courts should not consider public outrage at all. 
Consideration of outrage makes judicial decisions more difficult and unruly. And in the 
end, consideration of outrage might make decisions worse, not better, on consequentialist 
grounds. Suppose that judges will exaggerate outrage or see it when it does not even 
exist. Suppose that judges will exaggerate the effects of outrage even when it does exist. 
Perhaps the natural human tendency toward self-protection will make judges risk-averse 
with respect to outrage; perhaps they will give undue weight to the possibility that the 
Court will be sharply criticized in public (not itself an especially bad consequence).  
Suppose too that because public attacks on the judiciary will be especially salient 
to judges, consideration of outrage would produce undue timidity, in a way that will 
make judges less likely to do what they ought to do. Suppose that the role of an 
independent judiciary would be seriously undermined by consideration of outrage. On 
                                                 
62 An illustration is “confirmation bias,” by which people’s judgments about what is true are influenced by 
their desire to have their own beliefs confirmed. See, e.g., BARBARA O’BRIEN & PHOEBE ELLSWORTH, 
CONFIRMATION BIAS IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS (2006), available at  
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=913357. 
63 See Gunther, supra note 6. 20 
rule-consequentialist grounds, Bentham would be willing to consider a prohibition on 
judicial consideration of public outrage. History suggests that Bentham would be right to 
do exactly that; in the domain of free speech, judges have tended to overestimate the 
adverse consequences of allowing the airing of dissenting views, especially in wartime.
64 
If judges consider outrage and its effects, they may exaggerate the problem, thus adding 
to the excessive caution that judges might already feel when the stakes, and the heat, are 
high.
65 
There is another possibility. Bentham might ultimately reject the rule-
consequentialist argument on the ground that he is only one person and hence powerless 
to ban consideration of outrage on his own. Even if this is so, a social planner, engaged in 
system-wide design, might support that ban. Such a planner might attempt to inculcate a 
strong norm, or even a taboo, against judicial consideration of outrage. Consider the 
question whether judges should ask whether one or another political party would be 
benefited by a judicial decision. In most imaginable circumstances, a social planner 
would not want judges to ask that question; consideration of the political consequences 
would make the legal system much worse. Perhaps a similar argument justifies a general 
ban on consideration of public outrage, especially if judges cannot reliably assess the 
question of consequences. If they cannot do so, consideration of outrage may increase the 
burdens of decisions while also leading, on balance, to worse results. 
The rule-consequentialist argument certainly cannot be ruled out of bounds a 
priori. But it is not at all clear that this argument can be made convincing, at least not in 
the abstract. Even if judges have fallible tools for considering public outrage, they are not 
wholly at sea. If the Court invalidated the use of the words “under God” in the Pledge of 
Allegiance, public outrage would be entirely predictable; so too if the Court required 
states to recognize same-sex marriage; so too if the Court dramatically restricted 
Congress’ powers under the Commerce Clause. At least in cases in which outrage and its 
consequences are easily foreseen, it is hard to rule its consideration off-limits on rule-
consequentialist or systemic grounds. Cases 1A through 1F are plausible examples.  
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The conclusion is that for consequentialist reasons, widespread public outrage is a 
legitimate consideration where it would produce serious harm; it is appropriate for judges 
to limit the reach of their holdings, or to decline to decide certain issues, if such harm 
would be likely to occur. If this conclusion is not especially surprising in light of actual 
practice, all the better; we are now in a position to understand the grounds for that 
practice, and also the grounds on which it might be criticized. 
4.  Kantian adjudication revisited and some speculations about institutional 
morality. Let us return in this light to Kantian adjudication, captured in the view that 
judges should pay no attention to the risks of futility, perversity, or overall harm. 
Compare those who exercise the social role of doctors. In deciding what treatments to 
prescribe, doctors do not and should not ask whether extending the life of a particular 
patient will produce good consequences. Doctors are not permitted to prescribe 
ineffective treatments or to hasten death on the ground that the world would be better if 
certain patients died. Nor is it appropriate for lawyers, representing especially bad people, 
to collude with the prosecution to ensure a conviction and a stiff sentence. Defense 
lawyers are obliged to provide the best possible defense, and are not supposed to assess, 
in particular cases, whether the consequences might not be better if their clients were 
convicted.
66  
Perhaps judges are analogous. Perhaps their social role requires them to rule 
consideration of certain consequences off-limits. Perhaps judges should think in the 
following way: My job is to do as the law requires. In the most extreme cases, I might 
consider resigning from the bench, or I might consider engaging in a form of civil 
disobedience. But while exercising judicial power, my sole responsibility is to the law.  
As we shall see, a central problem with this view is epistemic: Judges might be 
unsure what the law requires, and public outrage might be relevant to that question. But 
the deeper problem is that a consequentialist justification is required for most judgments 
about what is appropriately considered by either private or public actors. Institutional 
morality, and role morality more generally, must be defended in terms of its effects. The 
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reason that lawyers should not ask themselves about the consequences of helping a 
particular client is that the legal system, taken as a whole, is better if lawyers do not so 
inquire. To be sure, the question is not identical for doctors. Human beings should be 
treated as ends rather than means, and there is a legitimate Kantian objection to a medical 
decision to hasten a patient’s death on consequentialist grounds.
67 But consequentialists, 
as such, can agree that people should be treated as ends; treating people as means is a part 
of the set of (bad) consequences that count.
68 In any event, judges are more closely 
analogous to lawyers than to doctors. If their decisions really would be futile or perverse, 
or produce overall harm, they should take those possibilities into account—unless rule-
consequentialist arguments convincingly suggest otherwise. Kantian adjudication, and the 
distinction between following the law and civil disobedience, are best understood as 
products of rule-consequentialism. 
There is a broader point here about the moral obligations of those who find 
themselves in certain social roles. Nearly every public institution is barred from taking 
account of certain considerations that ought to matter from a consequentialist perspective. 
Jurors are not supposed to ask whether a particular verdict would contribute to an 
increase in Gross National Product or find a favorable reception among most of their 
fellow citizens. Panels for the National Academy of Sciences are asked to say what is 
true, whatever the consequences, and it would be outrageous to ask such a panel to distort 
scientific findings in order to avoid public outrage. Members of public institutions—
including juries, National Academy of Sciences panels, and regulatory agencies—are not 
supposed to ask whether one or another conclusion would help their preferred political 
party, even if members of such institutions believe that the consequences would be much 
better if their preferred party were helped.  
The ban on consideration of certain factors often operates as a moral taboo; but 
why? In most settings, the overall consequences are much better if institutions refuse to 
take account of certain consequences. A virtue of assessing institutional morality in this 
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way is that it permits us to explore whether, in fact, any particular taboo can be justified 
in consequentialist terms.
69  
5.  Judicial hedometers and consequentialism writ (very) large. Outrage is an 
extreme reaction to a judicial ruling, and it is distinctly associated with a risk of bad 
consequences. But it is easy to imagine other reactions. Perhaps people would not be 
outraged; perhaps they would be disgusted, dismayed, frustrated, or disappointed. 
Alternatively, they might have a range of positive reactions to a ruling. They might be 
happy, gratified, relieved, thrilled, or exhilarated. Perhaps those positive reactions will 
produce an array of valuable consequences.
70 If the Court invalidated certain restrictions 
on the rights of property owners, surely many property owners would be pleased,
71 and 
their positive reactions might have desirable economic effects. (Perhaps the consequences 
would be good for economic growth.) When the Court struck down the ban on same-sex 
relations,
72 many people were undoubtedly elated.  
Suppose that all judges had a well-functioning “hedometer”—a device that could 
produce accurate measures of people’s affective reactions to judicial decisions. Should 
judges consider the hedonic consequences of their rulings, either in themselves or 
because of their eventual effects? Or suppose that judges could consult contingent 
valuation studies, in which people stated their willingness to pay for certain judicial 
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decisions.
73 People are willing to pay significant amounts to ensure the existence of 
pristine areas and animals; “existence value” is an established part of the practice of 
contingent valuation.
74 Surely people would also be willing to pay significant amounts to 
ensure the existence of certain legal outcomes; these too have an existence value. Ought 
judges to pay attention to any relevant evidence? Such questions seem fanciful, but it is 
important to figure out why. 
For the committed consequentialist, it is tempting to answer that judges should 
consider all relevant consequences, not merely those associated with outrage. Negative 
feelings are themselves a social loss,
75 and positive feelings are a social gain. And if 
negative feelings would result in adverse effects, they should certainly count. A political 
leader, deciding whether to support a proposed bill, might well be influenced by negative 
reactions of this kind, not only because her reelection prospects might be affected, but 
also because she is a considered consequentialist. If judges have crystal balls, and are 
therefore able to make perfect forecasts, the consequentialist judgment would seem to be 
that they should reach the same conclusion, considering not merely outrage, but the full 
array of effects of their decisions.  
But for rule-consequentialist reasons, and from the standpoint of system design 
for real-world judges, that conclusion would be hard to defend. It is an understatement to 
say that judges lack reliable methods for measuring the hedonic effects of their rulings. 
Any attempt to try would undoubtedly be subject to distortions. There are also questions 
about whether all hedonic effects should count in the social welfare calculus, 
independently of whether they should count in the judicial calculus: If people would be 
pleased at the continuation of torture or discrimination, does their pleasure count?
76 If 
judges attempted the relevant measurement, and made its outcome relevant in hard cases, 
the consequences would probably be worse, not better. If judges should care at all about 
public reactions, the argument for doing so is strongest in the case of outrage, because 
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outrage is likely to produce the most damaging consequences. The effects associated with 
other hedonic states are exceedingly difficult to predict.  
 
E. Consequentialist Hesitations 
 
With respect to public outrage and its effects, we are left with two possible 
conclusions. Perhaps Kantian adjudication is ultimately right, because blindness to 
consequences is likely to produce the best consequences. This conclusion might be 
defended on several grounds. First, courts lack reliable tools for deciding whether 
outrage and adverse effects would be present; they might well produce false negatives 
and false positives, Second, consideration of outrage would undoubtedly lead to strategic 
behavior, making outrage partly endogenous to the Court’s willingness to take it into 
account. If people are aware that their outrage will affect the Court, then they will have 
every reason to produce outrage, creating a kind of heckler’s veto. Third, consideration of 
outrage might produce undue timidity, especially in areas in which the Court’s role is 
most important. If widespread outrage is understood to be a legitimate reason for the 
Court to fail to act, then the Court will uphold government decisions that, by hypothesis, 
violate the Constitution, simply because people are outraged at what the Constitution 
commands. If the document is taken as a kind of precommitment strategy,
77 designed to 
check certain actions however intensely supported at any moment in time, then 
consideration of outrage will produce bad consequences, once those consequences are 
properly understood and weighted. 
But another conclusion is possible, and it too is reasonable: In extreme cases, 
judges have sufficient information to know whether outrage will exist and have 
significant effects, and in such cases they rightly hesitate before imposing their view on 
the nation. This was Bickel’s position about certain controversial rulings in his era,
78 and 
it helps to explain the view that the Court was right not to invalidate the ban on racial 
intermarriage in the 1950s
79 and wrong to rule so broadly on the abortion question in the 
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early 1970s.
80 It is easy to imagine analogues today, including invalidation of bans on 
same-sex marriage, a large-scale expansion of the takings clause,
81 a constitutional attack 
on references to God in currency and in the Pledge of Allegiance, and sharp limitations 
on congressional authority as, for example, through invalidation of popular 
environmental legislation. In at least some of these cases, consequentialist considerations 
do seem to justify a degree of judicial hesitation. I will offer more details below.  
  
III.  Humility, Invalidations, and the Condorcet Jury Theorem 
 
Now let us relax a key assumption, involving not crystal balls but the judge’s 
level of confidence. Let us suppose we are dealing not with Justice Bentham but with 
Justice Condorcet. 
Suppose that Condorcet accepts propositions 1A–1F, but he is not entirely certain 
that he is correct to do so. Let us stipulate that in these cases, Condorcet is aware that 
most officials and most citizens disagree with him about the appropriate understanding of 
the Constitution. If so, Condorcet might find anticipated public outrage relevant not for 
the reasons discussed thus far, but for an epistemic reason: Intense public opposition is a 
clue that his interpretation of the Constitution is incorrect. To make the argument most 
plausible, let us suppose that Condorcet’s acceptance of propositions 1A–1F is 
inconsistent with the shared judgment of the President, almost all members of Congress, 
and the overwhelming majority of state and local officials and ordinary citizens. 
Condorcet might hesitate on grounds of humility; his own view about the Constitution’s 
meaning might be wrong. 
Of course Bickel, and those who share his confidence in judicial capacities, would 
have little sympathy for this argument. Recall that Bickel believed that by virtue of their 
insulation, judges are in a particularly good position to announce the enduring values that 
the Constitution should embody.
82 To the extent that this belief is correct, judges do not 
have an epistemic deficit that would justify humility. But Bickel’s confidence on this 
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count is certainly not universally held, indeed it seems strikingly unself-conscious; and 
sensible judges are aware of their own fallibility. 
 
A. The Basic Argument 
 
To understand the hesitation of the relevant justice, consider the Condorcet Jury 
Theorem (CJT).
83 Suppose that members of some group are asked to resolve some 
question, and each member is at least more than 50% likely to be right. The CJT says that 
as the size of the group expands, the likelihood that a majority of the group will be right 
approaches 100%. The CJT helps to explain the “wisdom of crowds,”
84 that is, the 
frequent and apparently magical correctness of large collections of people in making 
judgments of fact.
85 If many people are asked some question of fact, with one right 
answer and one wrong answer, there is a strong likelihood that the majority will be right 
so long as all or most people are more than 50% likely to be right. Technical work shows 
that a similar result holds for plurality judgments about questions with more than two 
possible responses.
86  
Here is a mundane example from the constitutional domain: Suppose that there is 
a dispute about the original understanding of some constitutional provision—say, about 
whether the Equal Protection Clause, as originally understood, forbids racial segregation. 
Suppose that Condorcet is interested in the original understanding and that he believes 
that the Equal Protection Clause was, in fact, originally understood to ban racial 
segregation. If it turns out that Condorcet’s view is an outlier, and is accepted by almost 
none of those who have studied the relevant period, the CJT suggests that Condorcet is 
probably wrong. And if most specialists are outraged by Condorcet’s conclusion, 
Condorcet has particular reason to hesitate on epistemic grounds.  
Alert to the CJT, Condorcet might think the following: I accept propositions 1A-
1F. But most of the public disagrees with me. If crowds are wise, I may well be wrong, at 
least if the public’s disagreement bears on an issue that is relevant to the legal conclusion. 
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It might be useful to make a distinction here between judgments of fact and judgments of 
political morality. Suppose that Condorcet is not an originalist and that he believes that 
the constitutionality of capital punishment turns, in part, on whether that form of 
punishment has a deterrent effect. Suppose that the death penalty is constitutional only if 
it has a significant deterrent effect. On the basis of his own view of the evidence, 
Condorcet may doubt that there is any such effect. But if most people believe that capital 
punishment does, in fact, have a deterrent effect, then Condorcet might want to pay 
careful attention to their beliefs. Perhaps Condorcet is more interested in the views of 
specialists than in the views of the public at large; but if members of the public have 
some access to relevant information, the view of a strong majority might bear on the 
factual question.  
By contrast, suppose that the constitutionality of the ban on same-sex marriage 
does not turn on disputed facts, but instead on a judgment of political morality. Suppose 
that the question is whether the grounds for discriminating against gays and lesbians, in 
the particular domain of marriage, are legitimate. Is the CJT irrelevant? It would be if we 
believe that moral judgments cannot be right or wrong. If we are moral relativists or 
skeptics, we will not have much interest in the idea of moral truth. But suppose we 
believe that such judgments are in fact subject to evaluation; if Condorcet’s moral views 
are relevant to his legal conclusions, he had better share that belief. Even if a moral 
judgment is crucial, the views of the public might provide some clues about what 
morality in fact requires. If most people reject Condorcet’s moral conclusions, he might 
worry that he is missing something or that his conclusions are wrong. 
To come to terms with these possibilities, much will depend on the prevailing 
theory of constitutional interpretation. If Condorcet’s theory is originalist, the views of 
the public might not much matter; as should be evident and as we shall see in more detail, 
those views are not likely to tell Condorcet much about the nature of the original 
understanding. (Nonetheless, the CJT suggests that he should be interested in the views 
of specialists.) But suppose, with Bickel and many others,
87 that Condorcet’s conclusions 
about the meaning of the Constitution do in fact depend on some judgment of political 
morality. If so, then the views of others might well be relevant. And indeed, the Court’s 
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decision to strike down criminal bans on same-sex relationships had a great deal to do 
with its perceptions of contemporary social values, in a way that suggested an implicit 
Condorcetian logic.
88  
Suppose that Justice Condorcet believes that in cases 1A–1F, he is obliged to try 
to bring forward the best justification, in principle, for the fabric of existing law.
89 The 
public’s views might provide valuable information about which justification is best. Of 
course Condorcet will not be much interested in those views if they are irrelevant to what 
matters under his theory of interpretation (a point to which I will return). A strong 
division between the domain of law and the domain of politics and morality would 
weaken and possibly eliminate the epistemic argument for attending to public outrage.  
 
B. Outraged, and What Are They Outraged About? 
 
To sharpen the question, we need to know what proposition, exactly, the public’s 
outrage can be taken to affirm. The initial objection to the epistemic argument is that 
public outrage may not be related to any proposition in which Justice Cordorcet should be 
interested. 
If the public is outraged by 1A–1F, it is most unlikely to be motivated by its 
independent interpretation of the Constitution. The outrage is more likely to reflect a 
judgment about the actual social risks, speaking empirically, that would be created by 
(for example) same-sex or polygamous marriages or abolition of the death penalty, or 
about the social values, speaking in purely moral terms, that the existing practices 
promote. For the outrage to matter to the Condorcetian judge, it must be because the 
public’s judgments on these points bear on, or overlap with, the judgments that give rise 
to constitutional interpretation. This is hardly unimaginable. Perhaps the public believes 
that there is a legitimate and weighty reason to ban polygamy, and perhaps that belief 
bears on the constitutional issue. Perhaps the public believes that under contemporary 
conditions, the President needs the authority to commit troops without congressional 
authorization, and perhaps that judgment of need is relevant to the meaning of the 
Constitution.  
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Or consider another possibility, involving not the public as such but a relevant 
segment of it. Perhaps Condorcet should focus not on the public, but on the outrage of 
prominent officials who are themselves charged with the duty of complying with the 
Constitution. Perhaps the executive branch, and many legislators, have a considered view 
about what the Constitution requires with respect to 1A–1F. If the executive branch 
thinks that there is no constitutional problem with the death penalty, or that bans on 
polygamy are unobjectionable, then that view may be worth serious consideration. As I 
have suggested, a great deal depends on the appropriate constitutional method. If the 
executive operates on originalist premises, and if Condorcet rejects those premises, then 
the view of the executive and its level of outrage would appear to be neither here nor 
there. But suppose that Condorcet is not sure, in the end, of the appropriate constitutional 
method. On grounds signaled by the CJT, Condorcet should hesitate before rejecting a 
view, even about method, that is widely held. Perhaps Condorcet’s judgment about 
method will be influenced by the majority of large groups of people; the CJT suggests 
that it ought to be. And if the widely held view depends on a method that he accepts, he 
might well attend to it. 
Thus far I have assumed that the views of the public are relatively uniform, on the 
view that with that assumption, the epistemic argument for attention to outrage is most 
straightforward. But it is far more likely that the public will be divided. Suppose, for 
example, that thirty percent of the public agrees with 1A, that fifty percent disagrees, and 
that twenty percent is unsure; suppose that of those who disagree, only about two-thirds 
are genuinely outraged. Or suppose that for 1B, eighty percent disagree, twenty percent 
agree, and only eighty percent of those who disagree are outraged. In the face of divisions 
of this kind, judges will have far more difficulty in understanding whether the epistemic 
reasons for attention to public outrage are present. The CJT is helpful only when there is 
a consensus, or something close to it, on a relevant proposition from a group most of 
whose members are more than 50 percent likely to be right. I will return to this point 
below.  
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C. Biases and Cascades 
 
Sometimes widely held views are uninformative about what is true. If Americans 
were asked about the distance between Paris and Nigeria, the number of federal statutes 
invalidated by the Supreme Court, or the weight of the moon, there would be no 
particular reason to trust the majority’s answer. If most people are likely to blunder, the 
average answer, or the majority answer, has no epistemic credentials. In the constitutional 
context, there is especially good reason to think that widespread public judgments 
deserve little weight.  
1. Bias. Suppose, first, that judgments of the public are less than 50% likely to be 
right, as for example because of some kind of systematic bias. If so, the majority is not 
likely to right. On the contrary, the simple arithmetic behind the CJT shows that the 
likelihood that the majority will be wrong approaches 100% as the size of the group 
expands
90! To see the point, begin with an area outside of the domain of constitutional 
law and suppose that most people underestimate the number of people who die from 
asthma attacks; let us suppose that the relevant deaths are not cognitively “available,” and 
the availability heuristic biases their judgments.
91 If so, it is senseless to ask what most 
people think. Because of a systematic bias, their judgments will be erroneous.  
Now turn to the legal domain and consider the constitutional validity of statutory 
bans on racial intermarriage. It should hardly be controversial to suggest that public 
disapproval of racial intermarriage is a product of a systematic bias. Insofar as that 
disapproval bears on the constitutional issue, it is easily understood as biased in light of 
the relevant equal protection norms, in which Condorcet deserves to have confidence. 
Very plausibly, public disapproval of racial intermarriage stems from systematic biases 
with respect to facts as well as norms. Why should Condorcet pay attention to people’s 
error-prone judgments? 
The general problem is that if Condorcet has good reason to believe that most 
people suffer from a kind of prejudice that infects their judgments, he ought not to pay 
attention to what they think. And in fact, the real Condorcet emphasized that “prejudice” 
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can introduce a distortion that makes his arithmetic unlikely to produce good results: “In 
effect, when the probability of the truth of a voter’s opinion falls below 1/2, there must be 
a reason why he decides less well than one would at random. The reason can only be 
found in the prejudices to which this voter is subject.”
92 Bickel’s emphasis on the 
consequentialist grounds for concern with public outrage, and his failure to see the 
epistemic grounds, is best understood as a product of a belief that when the Court and the 
public diverge, the Court will be right and the public will be wrong.
93 Perhaps Bickel was 
far too confident on this count; but we can easily imagine cases in which judges rightly 
distrust the public.  
The question, then, is whether a bias might distort people’s judgments with 
respect to 1A–1F, in which case those judgments have no epistemic value. It would be 
entirely plausible for Justice Condorcet to worry about the risk of such a bias; 1A and 1E 
are especially good candidates. 
2. Cascades. The second problem is that people’s judgments may be a product of 
an informational, moral, or strictly legal cascade, in which case they lack the 
independence that the CJT requires.
94  
a. Basic processes. In an informational cascade, most people form their judgments 
on the basis of the actual or apparent judgments of others.
95 Consider a stylized example. 
Adams says that in her view, the death penalty deters. Barnes does not have a great deal 
of private information, but having heard Adams’ belief, she agrees that the death penalty 
deters. Carlton would have to have reliable information in order to reject the views of 
Adams and Barnes—and he lacks that information. If he follows Adams and Barnes on 
the ground that their shared belief is likely to be right, Carlton is in a cascade. Davison, 
Earnhardt, and Franklin may well follow the shared views of Adams, Barnes, and 
Carlton, at least if they lack private information.
96  
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It is easy to imagine moral analogues,
97 in which Carlton follows Adams and 
Barnes, not because they independently agree, but because they do not have enough 
confidence in their antecedent moral views to reject the judgments of others. With respect 
to same-sex marriage, it is plausible to think that moral cascades are pervasive. Many 
people are outraged by same-sex marriage, not because of their own independent 
judgments, but because of the real or apparent moral convictions of trusted others. In the 
domain of terrorist behavior, the moral judgments that produce violence are typically a 
product of social influences;
98 outrage is itself fueled and increased by such influences. 
There is no need to speculate about cascade effects on juries, for an experimental study 
found that jurors’ level of outrage is greatly amplified as a result of deliberative 
processes.
99 Outrage is demonstrably heightened by the outrage of others, so as to ensure 
that groups are far more outraged than were the individuals who compose them in 
advance of deliberation.
100 
b.  Outrage cascade and meaning entrepreneurs. Informational and moral 
cascades might well be responsible for public outrage in response to a judicial ruling. 
Suppose, for example, that people believe that polygamy harms women, or that same-sex 
marriage is morally unacceptable, not because of any private information or even 
judgment, but because they are reacting to the informational signals given by others. We 
could readily imagine legal cascades as well, in which the public’s constitutional 
judgments develop not on the basis of independent assessments of the merits, but in 
response to the actual or apparent legal judgments of others. Within the lower courts, 
such cascades do seem to develop among judges.
101 If precedential cascades can be found 
within the court system, there is every reason to believe that legal cascades occur within 
the legal culture, or the public culture in general, as the constitutional judgments of a few 
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help to produce an apparently widespread view in favor of one or another position. If 
such cascades are widespread or enduring, they might even become self-confirming, as 
the widespread judgment becomes entrenched within the public and eventually within the 
law. 
Cascades might be spontaneous or deliberately induced. Spontaneous cascades 
arise because a few early movers express their view in a prominent way; the early movers 
increase the salience of the Court’s decisions and might eventually produce widespread 
outrage. Alternatively, political actors in the public or private sectors might work very 
hard to generate a cascade effect, using the popular media to generate a great deal of 
public opprobrium. It is easy to imagine “meaning entrepreneurs,” who take it as their 
task to inculcate a certain view of constitutional meaning, and to spread that view far and 
wide. In either case, there is no particular reason to trust the apparent judgments of large 
groups on Condorcetian grounds. By hypothesis, such groups are responding to the 
beliefs of only a few. A precondition for deference to the wisdom of the crowd—a large 
number of independent judgments—is absent. 
3. Hesitation and humility without the CJT. Most generally, and even without 
speaking of a systematic bias, Condorcet might well want to accept himself: Is it really 
the case that many or most members of the public are more likely than not to provide 
correct answers to legally relevant questions of fact and morality? If morality is pertinent 
to constitutional adjudication, Condorcet might be puzzled by the suggestion that most 
people will answer the key questions correctly. Suppose that Condorcet is exploring some 
constitutional question associated with racial segregation, free speech in a time of war, 
the Establishment Clause, or discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation. Why—
Condorcet might wonder—should I believe that most people are more than 50 percent 
likely to provide the right answer to the underlying question? 
If Condorcet cannot answer this question, and hence finds the CJT irrelevant, he 
might nonetheless hesitate on epistemic grounds before rejecting the views of the 
majority. He might believe that the issue is comparative: Is the public more likely, or less 
likely, to be right than are federal judges?
102 Does the answer to this question change if 
the public is genuinely outraged? If Condorcet is an originalist, he will be confident that 
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the public’s views do not much matter. If he follows Bickel, and thinks that judges have 
unique ability to discern evolving values, he will not be much interested in what the 
public thinks. We can therefore find a temporary epistemic alliance (truce?), in rejecting 
the views of the public, between originalists and many of those who believe that the 
Constitution’s meaning evolves over time.  
But Condorcet might observe that the Court consists of nine lawyers—mostly 
white, mostly male, mostly wealthy, and mostly old (or at least not young). In light of 
that fact, he might believe that judges are at an epistemic disadvantage in answering some 
important questions—perhaps because of their relative lack of diversity,
103 perhaps 
because they are the ones who are likely to suffer from a systematic bias. If Condorcet 
thinks in this way, and if he believes that judgments of fact or morality bear on 
constitutional meaning, he might well be interested in the widely held views of the 
public.
104 
 
D. A Practical Problem and a Conclusion 
 
  In theory, these points are straightforward. In practice, they create serious 
problems for those who invoke epistemic grounds for considering public outrage. 
Suppose that Condorcet is a humble judge, alert to his own fallibility, who wants to 
consider the views of others unless there is a systematic bias or some kind of cascade 
effect. Condorcet must decide whether a bias or a cascade is at work. Suppose, first, that 
he has unerring tools for making that decision. If so, there is no particular problem; he 
knows when the circumstances are right for consulting the public’s view. But if 
Condorcet really does have such tools, he probably knows a great deal, and he might well 
be able rely on his own judgment. If so, he need not worry about what other people think.  
Suppose, as is far more realistic, that he lacks such tools. To know whether the 
public suffers from a relevant bias or thinks as it does because of a cascade, Condorcet 
has to answer some hard questions – conceptual, normative, and empirical. As a judge, he 
will likely lack the tools to answer them well. Realistically, his own views about the 
merits, in cases 1A-1F, will undoubtedly influence his answers. If most people disagree 
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with him, he is likely to conclude that they do, in fact, suffer from some kind of bias. 
There is a pervasive risk that any judge, asking whether the preconditions for collective 
wisdom are met, will answer the question affirmatively only when he already agrees with 
what people think.  
Let us imagine that Condorcet can overcome this problem and approach the 
underlying questions in an acceptably neutral way. Is it possible for him to know when a 
bias or a cascade is at work? In the abstract, we can imagine how he might make progress 
on that question. Perhaps his theory of interpretation permits him to consider certain 
judgments to be “biases” in a constitutionally relevant sense. Perhaps he believes that if 
most people oppose racial intermarriage, or same-sex marriage, on moral grounds, those 
very grounds are illicit under the proper theory of (say) the Equal Protection Clause. 
Perhaps the public is split along lines that suggest, or do not suggest, some kind of bias. If 
members of identifiable groups—religious or otherwise—are not likely to be outraged, 
Condorcet might believe that the existence of outrage among other such groups does not 
have much epistemic value. With respect to cascade effects, Condorcet must inquire into 
the social and political dynamics by which the public thinks as it does. 
Perhaps Condorcet would like to consult the wisdom of the crowd to obtain an 
answer to the meta-question whether there is a bias or cascade, but on the meta-question, 
a bias and a cascade may also be at work (and so too on the meta-meta-question). Perhaps 
Condorcet can work with presumptions of one or another kind. If he is particularly 
humble, he will find a bias or suspect a cascade only if he is very firmly convinced that 
one or the other is present. 
The epistemic argument for considering public outrage emerges as plausible but 
quite fragile. For the argument to have any force at all, public outrage must reflect a 
consensus on some proposition of fact or value that bears on the legal conclusion. Even if 
it does so, such outrage may be a product of a systematic bias or some kind of cascade. 
Judges lack good tools for investigating that question. If there is a consensus within the a 
relevant community on a question of law, or on a question that bears on the right answer 
to a question of law, then judges might pay attention to that consensus. But in hard cases, 
these circumstances will be rare. 
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E. Beyond Outrage (Again) 
 
To the extent that the epistemic point is taken seriously, we might well wonder 
about the focus solely on outrage.
105 Perhaps outrage is simply an extreme point along a 
continuum of disapproval, starting with mild disagreement and culminating in outrage. 
Under the CJT, what matters is numerosity, not intensity. Suppose that 90 percent of the 
public believes that the Court would be wrong to strike down bans on polygamous 
marriages, or to rule that the President lacks the authority to commit troops to combat an 
apparent threat. At first glance, outrage is not important. What matters is whether the 
underlying judgment is widely held. 
As I have noted, the Court’s decision to invalidate a ban on same-sex sodomy 
seemed to have a great deal to do with a belief that invalidation fit with emerging social 
values.
106 Thus the Court said that “In the United States criticism of Bowers has been 
substantial and continuing, disapproving of its reasoning in all respects,”
107 and the Court 
emphasized “an emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial protection to adult 
persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives . . . .”
108 And if nonjudicial actors 
would disagree with a decision, that point might seem relevant too, even if their 
disagreement is much milder than outrage. Armed with an understanding of some of the 
arguments thus far, we can better appreciate two time-honored views about the 
appropriate role of the judiciary in American government. 
1. Thayerism. Begin with the view associated with James Bradley Thayer, which 
asks judges to defer to any plausible understanding of the Constitution.
109 Thayer argued 
that because the American Constitution is often ambiguous, those who decide on its 
meaning must inevitably exercise discretion.
110 Thayer’s argument, in brief, was that 
courts should strike down laws only “when those who have the right to make laws have 
not merely made a mistake, but have made a very clear one,—so clear that it is not open 
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to rational question.”
111 The question for courts “is not one of the mere and simple 
preponderance of reasons for or against, but of what is very plain and clear, clear beyond 
a reasonable doubt . . . .”
112  
Thayer was concerned about public judgments in general, not about outrage in 
particular. There is an unmistakable Condorcetian dimension to Thayer’s own argument 
for the view that courts should uphold government decisions unless they are 
unconstitutional “beyond a reasonable doubt.”
113 If the public and its representatives, 
who have their own duty of fidelity to the document, have understood a constitutional 
provision in a certain way, then the Court should pay respectful attention to their views. 
At the very least, a point of this kind provides a plausible reason for the Court to take 
account of the constitutional views of other branches of the national government,
114 and 
perhaps of the constitutional judgments of the high courts of other nations.
115 If other 
branches have focused squarely on the constitutional question, and reached a consensus 
in favor of one or another view, the Court might well pay attention for epistemic reasons. 
2. Social commitments and the place of consensus. On an alternative view, the 
Court should pay close attention to existing social commitments in deciding when and 
whether to strike down legislation. Indeed, some of the most aggressive invalidations by 
the Court have been defended on the ground that they reflect widespread social 
judgments.
116 In some cases, the Court has explicitly referred to such judgments as a 
basis for invalidating legislation. At first glance, it is puzzling to suggest that the 
Supreme Court should strike statutes down on this ground.
117 But some statutes, 
especially at the state level, may reflect judgments of fact or morality that are inconsistent 
with the views of the public at large. If this is so, and if the Court can reliably measure 
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public convictions, there is a plausible Condorcetian justification for taking them into 
account, at least on a certain view of constitutional interpretation. 
Interesting debates might be imagined between Thayerians, reluctant to invalidate 
legislation on epistemic grounds, and those who are willing to do so on those same 
grounds. Thayerians would be tempted to emphasize the lack of good tools by which 
judges might measure public convictions; their adversaries would respond that it makes 
no sense to identify any particular statute, especially at the state level, with the will of the 
public. What is of interest here is that both sides are likely to raise a simple question: 
What makes outrage distinctive, if the epistemic argument is the governing one?  
If an answer exists, it is that outrage suggests a degree of both confidence and 
intensity, in a way that strengthens the epistemic credentials of the public judgment. 
Recall that under the CJT, a successful answer from a large group can be expected if 
most people are at least more that 50 percent likely to be right. The key point is that if 
most people are confident that they are right, we might be able to find that the conditions 
for a correct group answer are more likely to be present. When people are less confident 
of a position, their views tend to moderate;
118 and it is hard to be outraged without a 
degree of confidence. Moreover, confidence is associated with accuracy.
119 Of course 
confident people are often wrong. But confidence has been found to be “associated with 
correctness for both individual and group performance.”120 We might therefore think that 
when the public is outraged, it is more likely to be confident and hence its members are 
more likely to be right. 
These points must be taken with many grains of salt. People might be confident 
about some highly technical issue of law, but they might not be outraged if judges give 
the wrong answer, simply because the issue is highly technical and little might turn on its 
resolution. Alternatively, people might be outraged even though they are not entirely 
confident, simply because the stakes are so high. Perhaps outrage, when it is exists, is 
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associated with systematic bias or with cascade effect. Hence outrage is an imperfect 
proxy for confidence, just as confidence is an imperfect proxy for accuracy.
121  
 
IV. Outrage and Validations (with Notes on Statutory Interpretation) 
 
A. The Problem 
 
The public might be outraged by validations as well as by invalidations. Indeed, 
the public reaction to Supreme Court decisions seems to depend on the merits, not on 
whether the Supreme Court has upheld or struck down the decisions of the elected 
branches. If the Court ruled, tomorrow, that racial segregation by state governments is 
constitutionally unobjectionable, an intense reaction would be entirely predictable. If the 
Court said, next week, that the Bill of Rights does not apply to the states, the public 
would indeed be outraged. Let us imagine, then, a Justice Thayer, who accepts the 
following propositions: 
2A. The President’s national wiretapping program does not violate the 
Constitution. 
2B. The Establishment Clause does not apply to the states; it follows that 
mandatory school prayer does not violate the Clause. 
2C. The Takings Clause allows the government to characterize any minimally 
plausible justification as a “public use,” so as to allow it to take private property 
so long as compensation is paid.
122 
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 Assume that the public would be outraged by any of these decisions. It should be 
immediately clear that cases 2A–2C are importantly different from cases 1A–1F, because 
the former involve validation of government decisions. How, if at all, should Justice 
Thayer take account of the prospect of public outrage? How, if at all, should his analysis 
differ from that of Justices Bentham and Condorcet in cases 1A–1F? 
If these questions seem puzzling, we might note that outrage does play an explicit 
role in several areas of constitutional law, and here the Court has used outrage as a reason 
for invalidating legislation. In an early substantive due process case, the Court asked 
whether a disputed practice would “shock the conscience,” in a way that would “offend 
those canons of decency and fairness which express the notions of justice of English-
speaking peoples . . . .”
123 In deciding whether a punishment is cruel and unusual, the 
Court refers to “evolving standards of decency,”
124 an inquiry that is meant to attend to 
public judgments about what kinds of punishments are morally acceptable or instead 
beyond the bounds of “decency” (and in that sense outrageous). There seems to be an 
implicit Condorcetian dimension to these rulings, with the suggestion that widespread 
moral disapproval—and it is agreed that the disapproval needs to be widespread
125—is a 
measure of the moral acceptability of the practice. Insofar as the Court refers to evolving 
social values in due process adjudication,
126 its decisions can also be taken in 
Condorcetian terms. 
 
B. Thayerians and Outrage 
 
Let us stipulate that Thayer is a consequentialist and that he is not committed to 
Kantian adjudication as a matter of abstract principle. Indeed, let us stipulate that Thayer 
is a Thayerian for consequentialist reasons.
127 As a consequentialist, Thayer is certainly 
willing to pay attention to outrage, at least if it will have harmful effects. But cases 2A–
2C are different from cases 1A–1F, because even if outrage is present, it has a simple 
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outlet: The public can turn its outrage into legislation. If the public opposes the 
President’s national wiretapping program, it can ban it. If the public wants to forbid 
school prayer, it can do so, certainly at the state level and potentially through national 
legislation as well; Thayer himself would be reluctant to invalidate national legislation to 
this effect. If state or national governments seek to impose fresh restrictions on takings of 
private property, it can do exactly that. For this reason, the consequentialist arguments for 
taking account of outrage are, at the very least, much weakened in the case of validations. 
Now turn to the question of humility. Even if Thayer thinks that he might be 
wrong, the stakes are significantly lower than in cases 1A–1F, again because there is a 
democratic corrective for Thayer’s error. Indeed, Thayer’s willingness to validate 
legislation, in cases 2A–2C and more generally, might itself be influenced by a kind of 
rough-and-ready Condorcetianism. If legislation has been enacted, the public probably 
favors it, at least much of the time, and public approval gives some reason to believe that 
the legislation is justified in terms of facts and values (supposing again a theory of 
interpretation for which public approval has epistemic value). Of course well-organized 
private groups might be responsible for legislation, and the public would not care or 
might even disapprove; but as a humble judge, Thayer might be unwilling to ask hard 
questions about that possibility.  
And if Thayer puts the consequentialist and epistemic points together, he is not 
likely to be deterred, from his Thayerianism, by the prospect of public outrage at 
validations. The consequences of validations that produce outrage are not likely to be 
especially damaging, and because he is dealing with measures that have passed through 
democratic channels, the existence of outrage will usually lack much epistemic weight.  
The question of statutory interpretation can be understood in similar terms. 
Perhaps people would be very upset if the Court ruled that the Endangered Species Act 
forbids some important project, or that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 bans affirmative 
action. But even if such rulings produce outrage, the public can respond with legislative 
change. For this reason, the consequentialist objection is greatly weakened. It is true that 
a judge might hesitate to interpret an ambiguous statute in a certain way if all or almost 43 
all members of the (relevant) community believe that his view is wrong.
128 For 
Condorcetian reasons, it makes sense to pay attention to the views of relevant others. But 
public outrage may offer no relevant information at all. Suppose that the public wants to 
permit affirmative action, or to limit the reach of the Endangered Species Act. Its desires 
may well tell us exactly nothing about the proper interpretation of the relevant statutes.  
Of course the prevailing theory of statutory interpretation is critical here. If 
questions of political morality matter to that theory, public outrage might matter.
129 But if 
the judge’s view is a product of the statutory text and structure, the views of the public, 
and its likely outrage, would seem uninformative. And to the extent that public outrage 
does offer some kind of signal that the Court may be wrong, there is less reason for 
concern, because the Court’s error can be corrected. In any case, it is not clear that in the 
domain of statutory interpretation, public judgments provide any relevant information 
about whether the Court is correct. 
 
C. Complications 
 
These points are not necessarily decisive. It is often difficult to enact new 
legislation or to amend statutes, even when there is general agreement that such 
legislation or such an amendment is a good idea. In the constitutional domain, a 
consequentialist judge might be somewhat more inclined to strike down an enactment if 
validation would produce widespread outrage; and if the views of the public do have 
epistemic value, perhaps outrage at the prospect of validation could operate as a tie-
breaker or more. The democratic objections to judicial invalidation seem weakened if the 
public would be greatly disturbed by validation.
130 As we have seen, the Court does, in 
some areas of the law, consider widespread public outrage as a reason to invalidate 
legislation.  
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In the abstract, the idea of outrage at validations might seem puzzling, but it is 
certainly imaginable for one state, or a few states, to enact legislation of which the 
general public greatly disapproves. In invalidating such legislation, the Court might be 
vindicating widespread judgments against a small minority. Validation of legislation 
generally perceived to be outrageous might also trigger fears of widespread abridgements 
of important rights and interests; imagine a decision to validate some restriction on the 
right to use contraceptives. In most real-world cases, the public is likely to be divided, 
and a national consensus in opposition to the law that is being validated would be rare.
131 
But even if most of the public would be outraged by validation, it might not be so easy to 
produce a legislative corrective, at least not if a particular state is a genuine outlier or if a 
well-organized set of interests opposes that corrective.  
In a very hard case of statutory interpretation, perhaps a consequentialist judge, or 
a humble one, should construe a statute so as to avoid public outrage; perhaps that is the 
right course when the judge is otherwise in or close to equipoise.
132 But if judges cannot 
reliably decide whether outrage would be present, it is far more plausible to say that they 
should simply refuse to consider the question at all.  
It follows that in the context of validations and statutory interpretation, there is a 
strong rule-consequentialist argument for refusing to consider public outrage in deciding 
what to do. If courts refuse to consider outrage, they need not undertake an inquiry that 
might be difficult. And as we have seen, judges may not have excellent or even decent 
tools for knowing whether outrage would be present, or what consequences would result 
from outrage, or what epistemic credentials outrage might have. It follows that Justice 
Thayer will be inclined not to take account of outrage and will vote his convictions, as 
expressed in 2A-2C. 
  
V. Originalism, Moral Readings, and Outraged Minorities 
 
I have suggested that the argument for considering outrage is sensitive to the 
prevailing theory of interpretation. If a judge accepts originalism or is committed to 
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moral readings of the Constitution, the analysis must be somewhat different. It must be 
similarly altered if outrage is felt by a minority rather than a majority. 
 
A. Originalism 
 
Assume that Justice Berger is an originalist; she believes that the meaning of the 
Constitution is settled by the original understanding of the ratifiers. She accepts the 
following propositions:
133 
3A. The Second Amendment forbids existing gun control legislation. 
3B. Article II, section 1 forbids the creation of independent regulatory agencies, 
such as the National Labor Relations Board, the Federal Communications 
Commission, and the Federal Reserve Board. 
3C. The Equal Protection Clause does not ban discrimination on the basis of sex. 
Let us suppose too that under Berger’s approach to constitutional interpretation, 
stare decisis is not controlling; when the Court’s precedents are egregiously wrong, as she 
believes that it is in these cases, the Constitution should prevail, not the precedents.
134 At 
the same time, Berger believes, in cases 3A–3C, that a ruling would produce a great deal 
of public outrage.  
1. Originalism and consequences. Berger’s reaction to the prospect of outrage 
might well depend on why, exactly, she is an originalist. Suppose that she is an originalist 
because of her judgment about what is entailed by the very idea of interpretation.
135 She 
believes that attention to the original understanding is required if judges are to “interpret” 
the founding document rather than to make it up. If so, she is unlikely to care about 
intense public opposition. Judges are obliged to interpret the document, and the results do 
not matter.  
But by virtue of her theory of interpretation, Justice Berger is not compelled to 
reason in this way. She might believe that originalism is entailed by the very idea of 
interpretation, but her theory of adjudication might be consequentialist, in the sense that 
she believes actions, including judicial actions, must be judged by reference to their 
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consequences. Justice Berger might therefore be interested in the possibility of exercising 
the “passive virtues.” On this view, the appropriate steps, by judges who are originalists, 
are legitimately influenced by the consequences of those steps. Such an originalist would 
not be inclined to defy the original understanding in order to avoid bad consequences. But 
she might seek to avoid the key question on grounds of justiciability—certainly if the 
invocation of those grounds is defensible, or (preferably) right, on originalist grounds. In 
short, Justice Berger might have a nonconsequentialist theory of interpretation but also a 
consequentialist theory of adjudication, at least for purposes of deciding whether to 
exercise the passive virtues. 
Consider a different type of originalist, one who considers originalism to be “the 
lesser evil,”
136 in the sense that it will produce better results than any other approach to 
interpretation. For such an originalist, the justification of originalism is itself 
consequentialist. On this view, originalism is likely to produce the best outcomes, all 
things considered. Consider the illuminating suggestion by Randy Barnett, a committed 
originalist: “Given a sufficiently good constitutional text, originalists maintain that better 
results will be reached overall if government officials—including judges—must stick to 
the original meaning rather than empowering them to trump that meaning with one that 
they prefer.”
137  
Such an originalist might consider public opposition to be highly relevant. If 
Justice Berger is an originalist for consequentialist reasons, she is unlikely to favor 
originalism though the heavens may fall. The consequentialist considerations that justify 
originalism might lead this kind of originalist to try to avoid rulings of the sort indicated 
by 3A–3C, certainly if the consequences of such rulings would be very bad. Such an 
originalist would not interpret the Constitution in a way that violates the originalist 
understanding, but here too justiciability doctrines might be invoked to prevent the most 
radical rulings. Of course this result is not compelled. An originalist might believe that an 
insistence on originalism, producing 3A–3C, would produce good results, not bad ones, 
even if the public is outraged. The only point is that certain kinds of originalists would be 
entirely willing to take account of consequences and hence of outrage. 
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2. Originalism and epistemology. For originalists of any kind, humility and the 
CJT are much less likely to be important considerations. Why should an originalist care if 
most Americans believe that the Constitution allows gun control legislation or 
independent regulatory commissions, or forbids sex discrimination? The public 
consensus tells us little and probably nothing about the originalist understanding. Surely 
judges should pay attention if other originalists read the history in a way that is consistent 
with propositions 3A-3C. But public outrage, as such, is neither here nor there. 
The only qualification arises if other branches of government have decided, on 
originalist assumptions, to reject propositions 3A-3C. Perhaps originalists should also be 
Condorcetians, not in the sense that they should care about the views of the general 
public, but in the sense that they ought to attend to the consensus of those who use their 
preferred method. Here too, of course, a systemic bias or a cascade effect may be at work. 
If members of other branches reject 3A because of such a bias, or if their judgment on 3C 
is a result of a legal cascade, there is no reason to pay careful attention to their opinions. 
 
B. Moral Readings 
 
Suppose that propositions 1A–1F are supported by a “moral reading” of the 
Constitution, which asks judges to treat the founding document as establishing moral 
aspirations, which they should attempt to place in the best possible light, consistent with 
respect for the past.
138 Much of constitutional law does seem to reflect some kind of 
moral reading, for judicial judgments about the best moral understanding of constitutional 
principles sometimes play a large role in the Court’s conclusions.
139 For judges who are 
committed to moral readings, should public outrage receive consideration? Let us 
consider how Justice Hercules,
140 a moral reader of the Constitution, would approach the 
consequentialist and epistemic arguments. 
At first glance, Justice Hercules is unlikely to be impressed by those arguments. 
The point of the moral reading is to say (for example) how liberty and equality are best 
conceived in light of our practices; often the moral reading will run in the face of the 
                                                 
138 See R ONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 
(2000). 
139 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 387 U.S. 483 (1954). 
140 See DWORKIN, supra note. 48 
public will, and sometimes the moral reading will produce outrage (if only because the 
existing practice is outrageous). If Justice Hercules attends to public outrage, he will not 
give moral readings at all; consider 1A–1F in this light. There is a further problem. Those 
drawn to moral readings tend to be deontologists, not consequentialists.
141 Insofar as 
attention to outrage is justified on consequentialist grounds, the justification would seem 
uninteresting to those who endorse moral readings. 
But this conclusion may be premature; both consequential and epistemic reasons 
may be available. Justice Hercules should not welcome futile or self-defeating judicial 
rulings. As we have seen, deontologists do, and should, recognize the possibility of 
consequentialist overrides. It follows that if the consequences of outrage are bad enough, 
Justice Hercules should pay attention to it. It is certainly possible for judges to favor 
moral readings of the Constitution, and to see such readings in deontological terms, while 
also holding a consequential account of adjudication. 
Insofar as public outrage is a signal of widely held moral convictions, it may well 
be worth attention for epistemic reasons, subject to the qualifications noted above. If the 
public’s conception of liberty and equality is consistent with some practice, and if judicial 
validation of that practice might produce outrage, judges might pay attention to those 
facts.  
 
C. Outraged Minorities and Actual Practices 
 
The discussion thus far has assumed that the public as a whole would be outraged. 
This is a useful simplifying assumption, because it makes the consequentialist and 
epistemic issues more tractable. But most of the time, it is far more likely that public 
outrage will be limited to a minority and that most people will either approve of the 
Court’s decision or at least not be outraged by it. When a minority is outraged, its 
reaction is not likely to be translated into law. How does all this bear on the normative 
question? 
Begin with the Court’s actual practices. There are few cases in which the Court’s 
decision produced outrage within a strong majority of the public; the most obvious 
                                                 
141 See DWORKIN, supra note; FLEMING, supra note. 49 
example is the Court’s school prayer decision
142 and, even there, no constitutional 
amendment has come close to ratification. Most of the Court’s highly controversial 
decisions—involving school segregation,
143 abortion,
144 and property rights
145—have 
spurred real outrage in segments of the public, not the nation as a whole. This fact 
suggests that either the Court is highly sensitive to the risks associated with widespread 
outrage, or more plausibly that political controls on the Court ensure that the justices 
rarely (seek to) produce outrageous results. Because of the appointments process,
146 the 
justices are controlled, to some extent, by popular will; it is therefore most unlikely that 
they would be the kind of judges who would favor an interpretation of the Constitution 
that the public would regard as not only wrong but outrageously  
How do the consequentialist and epistemic arguments fare in the context of views 
intensely held by a minority? The epistemic point is easier to handle. Justice Condorcet is 
not likely to be much moved by learning that a minority of the public strongly rejects his 
reading of the Constitution. If the majority agrees with him, or is indifferent, the diversity 
of views within the community deprive the judgments of the minority of much in the way 
of epistemic credentials. Of course matters would be different if the minority consisted of 
specialists whose views were entitled to particular respect. But minority opposition, even 
if intensely felt, will not greatly influence Condorcet. 
The consequentialist arguments are less significantly affected. The question is 
whether outrage, localized as it may be, is likely to ensure futile or perverse outcomes, or 
overall bad consequences. If a minority is willing and able to resist a proposed remedy, 
the Court would do well to consider a remedy that will be more effective. If a minority is 
able to ensure that a result will be counterproductive, the analysis is not radically 
different from what it is if a majority is involved. The major difference is that if a 
majority approves of the Court’s decision, or does not disapprove, the likelihood of bad 
consequences is reduced. 
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VI. Nonjudicial Actors: Bentham and Condorcet in the Democratic Branches 
 
My emphasis throughout has been on the question whether judges should attend 
to public outrage. In this concluding section, I explore two related questions. The first is 
the relationship between popular constitutionalism and the arguments thus far; the second 
involves the implications of the argument for elected officials. 
 
A. We the People 
 
In recent years, many people have expressed interest in “popular 
constitutionalism”—in the view, with some roots in the founding period, that the meaning 
of the Constitution might be ultimately settled by We the People, not  by the federal 
judiciary.
147 On this view, the interpretations of the Supreme Court lack finality; the 
public is entitled to have the final say, not because it has ratified any constitutional 
amendment, but because it has settled on its own view about how the document is best 
understood. A related but more modest position emphasizes that other branches of 
government have an independent duty to be faithful to the Constitution, and that this 
independent duty calls for a degree of interpretive independence.
148 On a prominent 
version of this view, for example, courts systematically “underenforce” the Constitution, 
because of their awareness of their own institutional limitations.
149 It follows that the 
President and Congress might disapprove of (say) affirmative action or bans on same-sex 
marriage on constitutional grounds and take their own steps to prevent, and in a sense to 
invalidate, those same practices. It is not difficult to find examples of situations in which 
public officials, animated by their own views of constitutional commands, extend 
constitutional barriers in ways that the Supreme Court has refused to do.
150 
Perhaps public outrage can be seen as an especially dramatic exercise in popular 
constitutionalism, not least when it has concrete consequences. And when outrage is 
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expressed by the political branches, they may well be exercising their own independent 
interpretive authority, not least when they ask for more severe constitutional barriers than 
the Court has proved willing to erect.
151 If we emphasize the epistemic argument for 
judicial attention to outrage, we might see that argument as embodying, even calling for, 
a kind of popular constitutionalism, or at least attention to the independent interpretive 
judgments of other branches. 
I do not mean to speak directly here to the controversies over popular 
constitutionalism and the distribution of interpretive authority among the branches of 
government. Let us simply notice that when there is popular “backlash,” a great deal 
depends on its grounds, at least if the goal is to assess the question whether it can be seen 
as an exercise in popular constitutionalism. Perhaps the public’s judgment is not in any 
sense rooted in a judgment about constitutional meaning. Perhaps its outrage is a 
reflection of some kind of policy-driven, constitution-blind opprobrium. If a cascade is at 
work, the epistemic argument loses much of its force; so too if there is a systemic bias. 
On the other hand, “backlash” might legitimately be seen as constitutionally relevant 
insofar as it reflects a widespread and considered judgment about the merits of the 
constitutional issue. Here, as elsewhere, that question cannot be resolved without an 
account of constitutional interpretation and some information about what, exactly, lies 
beneath public outrage.  
 
B. Elected Officials 
 
Public outrage is relevant to the decisions of many public officials, including 
presidents, legislators, governors, and mayors. If they anticipate outrage in reaction to 
their decisions, they will often be deterred, even if they think that the outrage is 
unjustified or worse. Of course there is a large debate about whether representatives 
should make independent judgments or instead follow the views of those whom they 
represent.
152 Return in this light to cases 1A–1D; suppose now that the President of the 
United States holds the relevant views as a matter either of constitutional interpretation or 
of fundamental principle. He might hesitate to press those views for either of the two 
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now-familiar reasons. He might believe that if he acts in accordance with his convictions, 
he will produce bad consequences. Alternatively, he might believe that his own 
commitments are unreliable, simply because so many people disagree.  
Suppose, for example, that an American president concludes that same-sex 
marriages should be permitted; he believes that there is no good reason to ban such 
marriages, and indeed he believes that existing bans are a reflection of unjustified 
prejudice and hostility. He might nonetheless hesitate before insisting on this view. He 
might fear that such an insistence would compromise the ultimate goal of producing 
same-sex marriage. Perhaps an evolutionary process, involving a high degree of social 
learning, is the best way of achieving his preferred end. Perhaps his own approval would 
have a helpful influence on that process, but perhaps it would compromise his other 
important goals, including those relating to national security, energy independence, and 
income tax reform. Whether or not a court should be concerned about its limited political 
“capital,” a national leader certainly has to decide when to spend that capital. If a 
president has an assortment of projects, he might well hesitate before pressing a 
commitment that will generate public outrage.  
Consider here Abraham Lincoln’s practices with respect to slavery. Lincoln 
always insisted that slavery was wrong.
 153 On the basic principle, Lincoln allowed no 
compromises. No justification was available for chattel slavery. But the fact that slavery 
was wrong did not mean that it had to be eliminated immediately, or that blacks and 
whites had to be placed on a plane of legal equality. In Lincoln’s view, the feeling of “the 
great mass of white people” would not permit this result.
154 In his most striking 
formulation, he declared: “Whether this feeling accords with justice and sound judgment, 
is not the sole question, if indeed, it is any part of it. A universal feeling, whether well or 
ill-founded, can not be safely disregarded.”
155  
Evidently Lincoln believed that efforts to create immediate social change in this 
especially sensitive area could have unintended consequences or backfire, even if those 
efforts were founded on entirely sound principle. It was necessary first to educate people 
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about the reasons for the change. Passions had to be cooled. Important interests had to be 
accommodated or persuaded to join the cause. Issues of timing were crucial. For Lincoln, 
rigidity about the principle was combined with caution about introducing the means by 
which the just outcome would be achieved. As Bickel emphasized, the point is highly 
relevant to constitutional law, especially in the area of social reform.
82 It is easy to 
imagine why many elected officials might think in the same general terms suggested by 
Lincoln. 
Alternatively, the President might think that if most people do see a good reason 
to some social practice, their views are entitled to respect. Indeed, an elected official may 
well have stronger epistemic reasons to consider the views of the public and the prospect 
of outrage than do judges, simply because the views of the public are far more likely to 
bear on the question that concerns the official. Suppose that an official believes that 
affirmative action should be abolished tomorrow, or that abortion should be banned, but 
that a strong majority of the public disagrees. The official might conclude that the public 
has relevant information on questions of both fact and value, and that she should hesitate 
before acting in a way that violates public convictions. 
Here as well, however, the risk of systemic bias and cascade effects introduce 
important cautionary notes for politicians as well as for judges. A conscientious leader 
will inquire into the relevant risks in deciding whether to attend to the risk of outrage. 
The most general point is that an understanding of the consequentialist and epistemic 
arguments helps to explain debates over the concept of representation
156: Should 
politicians attempt to implement the public will, or should they understand themselves as 
having considerable discretion to depart from it
157? Those who are skeptical about official 
discretion might have an epistemic point in mind. Perhaps the public is likely, on some 
questions, to know a great deal more than the relevant officials. Alternatively, they might 
believe, with Lincoln, that in certain domains, the consequences would be very bad if 
officials diverged too sharply from the public will. An appreciation of the epistemic and 
                                                 
156 See HANNA PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION (1965). 
157 The latter view is implicit in The Federalist No. 10, with its reference to “refin[ing] and enlarg[ing]” the 
public view. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 46 (James Madison) (George W. Carey & James McClellan eds., 
2001). 54 
consequential arguments should help to show when, and why, the diverging models of 
representation have particular force.  
 
C. Juries 
 
Should juries attend to the risk of public outrage? We can imagine a variety of 
possible cases. (a) A conviction of a defendant would produce significant outrage. (b) An 
acquittal of a defendant would produce significant outrage. (c) A civil verdict, imposing 
damages on a police department, would produce significant outrage. (d) A civil verdict, 
refusing to impose damages on a police department or a corporate polluter, would 
produce significant outrage. Does the analysis of juries differ from the analysis of courts? 
In one respect, the analysis is indeed different: The epistemic argument for 
considering outrage seems weaker still. By its very nature, the jury will have heard the 
relevant facts, and it will therefore have a significant comparative advantage over the less 
informed public. It is hard to argue that on epistemic grounds, the jury should attend to a 
widespread public judgment in favor of conviction or liability. In addition, the jury is 
supposed to be representative of the public; and if it is indeed representative, it should be 
taken as a more knowledgeable microcosm. To be sure, the jury might bring its own 
moral convictions to bear on the resolution of some factual questions, and perhaps a 
widely held moral conviction on the part of the public as a whole, signaled by the 
presence of outrage, has some epistemic value. But it is hard to see circumstances in 
which jurors would do well, on epistemic grounds, to consult the views of a public that 
has (by hypothesis) failed to reflect on the facts and details of the case.
158 
In principle, the consequentialist argument is not so easily dismissed. Suppose 
that a criminal conviction would produce very bad consequences, such as riots that would 
ensure multiple deaths; suppose that a failure to convict would produce the same result. 
Suppose too that the jurors have an accurate crystal ball, so that they know, for certain, 
about those very bad consequences. At first glance, such consequences, if sufficiently 
bad, might well justify a refusal to convict. The issue is harder for criminal convictions; 
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the deontological objection to conviction of the innocent, in order to protect other 
interests, is not easily rejected.
159 Perhaps that objection can be overridden if the heavens 
would fall, or even if the consequences would be genuinely grave.  
The simplest response would be based on several points. Jurors lack crystal balls; 
consequence-blind jury determinations are rarely likely to produce especially bad 
consequences; jury judgments might well be distorted by considering consequences. It is 
reasonable to think that for rule-consequentialist and systemic reasons, consequences are 
properly placed off-limits to the decisions of juries. We can imagine a possible world, 
and a possible case, in which this argument might be wrong. But in our world, and in our 
cases, it is almost certainly correct.  
 
VII. Conclusion 
 
  If judges are consequentialists and have perfect confidence in their forecasts, they 
might well be willing to consider the likely effects of public outrage as part of their 
assessment of the consequences of one or another course of action. On epistemic 
grounds, judges might conclude that a widely and deeply held set of public convictions 
deserves respectful attention, at least if judgments of fact or political morality are 
pertinent to the constitutional question. The epistemic justification does not apply if a 
systematic bias is likely to affect public judgments or if most people are participating in 
some kind of informational, moral, or legal cascade.  
The strongest arguments against judicial attention to the effects of outrage are 
rule-consequentialist or based on considerations of system design. Perhaps the 
consequences will be best if judges put the effects of outrage entirely to one side. The 
broader point is that any judgment in favor of Kantian adjudication, or for restricting the 
set of considerations that judges may consider, must ultimately be defended in 
consequentialist terms. If people in certain social roles, such as the role of federal judges, 
blind themselves to certain considerations, the reasons are themselves consequentialist.  
  The arguments for considering the effects of outrage have the greatest force when 
judges are deciding whether to invalidate legislation. In the case of validations, there is 
far less reason to attend to public outrage. If the public greatly objects, it can respond by 
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changing the law through democratic means. To be sure, democratic change may be 
difficult. If courts had perfect tools by which to answer the underlying questions, some 
theories of interpretation would suggest that the risk of outrage is a reason to invalidate 
statutes, at least if judges are otherwise in equipoise. We have seen that widespread 
public outrage plays an occasional role in assessing whether punishment is cruel and 
unusual and whether certain statutes offend the Due Process Clause. But in the domain of 
validations, at least, there are usually good rule-consequentialist reasons to disregard 
outrage altogether. Those reasons are plausible but weaker in the case of invalidations. 
  I have emphasized that the strength of the argument for attending to outrage might 
well depend on the governing theory of interpretation. Originalists are not likely to accept 
the epistemic argument for considering outrage. For those who adopt a moral reading of 
the Constitution and who reject consequentialism, attending to outrage might seem 
jarring. Principle is what matters, and the fact that the public would be outraged does not 
seem to bear on what matters. But this conclusion is too quick, at least in some 
imaginable cases. Most deontologists believe in consequentialist overrides, and there is 
no reason to think that judicial judgments about the requirements of morality are 
unerring. For broadly similar reasons, originalists might themselves pay attention to 
public outrage on consequentialist grounds, even though the epistemic rationale seems 
weak. 
  These points bear on the much-discussed question whether public representatives 
should follow their own independent judgments or instead pay close attention to what the 
public believes and wants. Even if a representative’s beliefs diverge from that of the 
public, she might hesitate to insist on those judgments if her insistence would disserve 
her most important projects, or if she believes that the views of the public provide a 
signal that her own views are wrong. But my focus has been on the behavior of courts. In 
the general run of cases, outrage is indeed irrelevant; the rule-consequentialist objection 
is convincing. In imaginable circumstances, however, judges legitimately consider public 
outrage because and to the extent that consequences matter, and because and to the extent 
that outrage provides information about the proper interpretation of the Constitution.  
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